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Sundahl: Constitutional Law - One Man, One Vote - Application to Election

CASE NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-One Man, One Vote-Application to Election of
School District Trustees. Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City, Missouri, 397 U.S. 50 (1970).

Hadley was a resident taxpayer of the Kansas City School
District, which was one of eight school districts combined to
form the Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas
City. Under a Missouri statute separate school districts could
vote by referendum to estabish a consolidated district and
elect six trustees to conduct and manage the necessary affairs
of that district.'
In the consolidated school district the six trustees were to
be apportioned among its eight component districts on the
basis of each district's percentage of the total school enumeration, i.e., the number of persons between the ages of six and
twenty who resided in the district.' A Missouri statute' provided that all six trustees would be elected at large, except that
if the school district had more than one-third but less than 50
percent of the total enumeration of the proposed junior college
district each such district would elect two trustees and the remaining four would be elected at large. Similarly, districts
with more than 50 percent but less than two-thirds of the total
enumeration would elect three trustees, and the remainder
would be elected at large from the rest of the proposed district.
If any school district had more than two-thirds of the total
enumeration, such district could elect four trustees, and two
trustees would be elected at large from the remainder of the
proposed district.
The Kansas City School District had approximately 60
percent of the total school enumeration, but the apportion1. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 178.800 (1965) provides that in organizing a junior
college district area, a petition which requests such organization must
be presented to the state board of education. If the state board determines
that the area proposed meets the standards of need, available taxable
property, and sufficient number of students to attend, the board orders
an election to be held on the proposal and trustees. The proposal to
organize the district must receive a majority of the votes cast. If a majority
is achieved, the consolidated district is declared to be organized, and the
board then determines which candidates have been elected as trustees.
2. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 167.011 (1965).
3. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 178.820 (1965).
Copyright@ 1972 by the University of Wyoming
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ment plan permitted election of only 50 percent of the consolidated district's six trustees.'
Hadley and other resident taxpayers of the district
brought suit for declaratory judgment claiming that the statutory formula,5 whereby trustees for the Junior College District were elected, unconstitutionally diluted and debased their
right to vote in violation of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. The trial court dismissed the
petition with prejudice' and the Missouri Supreme Court
affirmed.7 The Missouri Supreme Court rejected the application of "one man, one vote" because the Junior College District was essentially an administrative body created by the
legislature for the sole purpose of conducting a college and
that it was not a local unit having general governmental
powers over the area it served. The United States Supreme
Court, by a 6-3 opinion, reversed and held: when a state or
local government decides to select officials by popular election
to a position which performs governmental functions, the
fourteenth amendment requires each voter be given an opportunity to have his vote given as much weight as that of any
other voter, and an apportionment scheme must insure that,
as far as practicable, an equal number of voters will vote for
a proportionally equal number of officials.'
Before 1962 the United States Supreme Court carefully
avoided any judicial interference in state apportionment plans
on the ground that they involved a political question and
therefore were not appropriate for judicial action. The determination of what constituted a representative form of government was left to the states,9 and for the judiciary to enter the
"political thicket"' 0 would invade the scope of legislative authority. However, in 1962 the Court decided Baker v. Carr"
and, in overruling the strong precedent established by Cole4.

Badly v. Junior College Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, Mo., 432 S.W.2d 328,

830 (Mo. 1968).
5. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 178.820 (1965).

6. Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metro Kansas City, Mo., supra note 4,
at 331.
7. Id.
8. Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, Mo., 397 U.S. 50
(1970).
9. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554-56 (1946).
10. Id. at 556.
11. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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grove v. Green, 2 upheld a claim challenging the constitutionality of a Tennessee legislature apportionment plan. The
Court ruled that the plan violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the fourteenth amendment because it resulted in impairment by dilution of the right to vote. The two major points
of the case were: (1) allegations of a denial of equal protection arising from a malapportioned legislative apportionment
plan presented a justiciable cause of action; and (2) the equal
protection clause provides discoverability and manageable
standards for determining the constitutionality of a state
legislative apportionment scheme if it appears that the discrimination involved reflects no policy, but only arbitrary
action. Baker thus led the Courts into the "political thicket."
The slogan "one man, one vote" sprang from the lan3 in which
guage of Mr. Justice Douglas in Gray v. Sanders"
he wrote, "The conception of political equality ... can mean
only one thing-one person, one vote."' In that case the Supreme Court nullified Georgia's county-unit system for primary elections in selecting state executive and administrative
officers. The Georgia system was one of indirect nomination
of candidates for the United States Senate, governor, statewide officers, justices of the state supreme court, and judge
of the state court of appeals. It was also formulated to apply
to the nomination of candidates for the United States House
of Representatives if a congressional district's Democratic
committee so determined. Under the county-unit system each
county got a specified number of unit votes. Since nominations were determined not by popular vote but by unit votes,
all the unit votes of a county went to the candidate with the
popular plurality in that county. A plurality of unit vote was
required to nominate except for governor and senator. In the
absence of a majority vote in the gubernatorial and senatorial
elections, a run-off primary was held. In case of a tie, the
candidate with the greatest popular vote was elected. The
greatest inequity of the system was that the populous counties
were so under-represented in this apportionment scheme that
the small, rural counties had a commanding voice in the nomi12. Supra note 9.
13. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
14. Id. at 381.
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nation process, 5 due largely to the Southern philosophy that
the heart of representation and true democracy lay in the rural
areas.16 The court struck down the system on the following
basis:
Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate
in the election are to have an equal vote ... wherever
their home may be in that geographical unit. This is
required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The concept of 'we the people'
under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class
of voters but equality among those who meet the basic
qualifications. 7
In 1964 "one man, one vote" was extended by Westberry
v. Sanders's to the state legislative districting plans for congressional elections involving invidious discrimination in the
exercise of the voting franchise. Out of this case came a modification in the strict equality standard set forth in Gray.9
Because the court realized that mathematical exactitude in
balancing apportionment with equal voting power would be
impossible, minor deviations were permitted, provided that
they would not expand or contract the value of some votes in
a discriminatory manner. Under Westberry the weight of
20
each vote was to be balanced "as nearly as is practicable,
thus giving districts some latitude and flexibility for apportionment purposes.
The case which firmly entrenched "one man, one vote"
as a viable constitutional doctrine was Reynolds v. Sims 2" and
its companion cases.2 2 In Reynolds the Court struck down a
malapportioned state legislature holding that the plaintiffs
were denied their rights under the equal protection clause
because there was serious discrimination against the voters in
15. On the basis of a 1940 population census, the apportionment was such that
the least populous counties received almost 5Y2 times the total unit vote
of the most populous counties. See KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS 119 (1950).
16. Id. at 117-29.
17. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963).
18. 376 U.S.1 (1964).
19. Gray v. Sanders, supra note 17.

20. Westberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
21.

377 U.S. 533 (1964).

22. Lucas v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock,
377 U.S.

695

(1964);

Davis v. Mann,

377 U.S.

678

(1964);

Maryland

Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); WMCA,
Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964).
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counties whose population had grown far more than others.
In so holding, the Court said that the Constitution protected
the rights of all qualified citizens to vote and to have that vote
counted. The basic premise was that reapportionment is generally a voting case, and that
[t] he right to vote freely... is the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right
strike at the heart of representative government.
And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just
as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise."
The Court accepted the idea espoused in Westborry that
mathematical exactitude is not a workable constitional standard and that apportionment based on population as equal as
practicable is permissible.24 Moreover, the Court noted the
first constitutional principles for determining when "one man,
one vote" would apply.
[T]he judicial focus must be concentrated upon ascertaining whether there has been any discrimination
against certain of the State's citizens which constitutes an impermissible impairment of their constitutionally protected right to vote.2"
The Court, after stating that such discrimination must be
"invidious," 26 refused to spell out any precise constitutional
tests, and it indicated that its reason for doing so was to preserve flexibility in apportionment.2 7
Although Reynolds and its companion cases involved only
the question of state legislative representation, the following
statement indicates that the constitutional philosophy applied
was broad enough to permit widespread expansion.
[T]he basic principle of representative government
remains, and must remain, unchanged-the weight of
a citizen's vote cannot be made to depend on where he
lives. Population is, of necessity, the starting point
for consideration and the controlling criterion for
23. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
24. Id. at 577.
25. Id. at 561.

26. Id.
27. Id. at 578.
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judgment in legislative apportionment controversies.
A citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so
because he lives in the city or on the farm. This is the
clear and strong command of our Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause.2"
This statement left the door open for further expansion of
"one man, one vote." However, in 1967 the Supreme Court
declined to extend the doctrine to the selection of city and
county legislative bodies in Dusch v. Davis"s because no invidious discrimination was shown to have existed."0 In Sailors
v. Board of Education"' the Court held the equal-population
principle also inapplicable to a board of education because the
board performed administrative functions, i.e., non-legislative
functions, and those positions were basically appointive rather
than elective. 2 Sailors set a concrete criterion for the nebulous equal protection doctrine of "one man, one vote "-that a
state must make a good faith effort to construct election districts so that substantially equal voting weight is insured for
elections. The new test for applying "one man, one vote" was
whether the function of the body involved is legislative rather
than administrative.3 3 If the function was legislative, the
doctrine would apply; if administrative, there would be no
equal protection violation.
The question which necessarily arose from Sailors was
whether application of "one man, one vote" could be made to
traditional administrative bodies whose powers were derived
by delegation from an elected legislative body. This question
was partially solved in Avery v. Midland County,3 4 which extended the doctrine to local government. The Supreme Court
noted the increasing importance of local government in the
lives of its citizens and held that because a constituency at28. Id. at 567-68.
29. 387 U.S. 112 (1967).
30. In Dusch the Supreme Court was confronted with the "Seven-Four Plan,"
under which four of eleven city councilmen were elected at large without
regard to residence. The remaining seven were required to be residents of
the borough from which they were elected, but were elected at large.
Although the populations of the boroughs varied drastically, the Court
held that the plan did not violate the equal protection clause because all
councilmen were elected at large.
31. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
32. Id. at 108, 111. The county school board members were appointed from
elected representatives of the local school boards.
33. Id.
34. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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taches enough significance to an office to make it elective, the
equal protection clause should apply. The far-reaching extension of "one man, one vote" was accomplished by an analogy
to reapportionment of the state legislative level; the Court saw
little difference between the exercise of state power through
legislatures and its exercise by elected officials on the local
level. In other words, the fourteenth amendment was applied
to state political subdivisions because actions of local government were actions of the state.
When the State apportions its legislature, it must
have due regard for the Equal Protection Clause.
Similarly, when the State delegates lawmaking power
to local government and provides for the election of
local officials from districts specified by statute,
ordinance, or local charter, it must insure that those
qualified to vote have the right to an equally effective
voice in the election process. 5
Beyond the specific holding is the consideration that the
Court neatly solved the problem in Sailors which arose from
attempting to separate legislative from executive and administrative functions as a criterion for applying the Equal Protection Clause. Although the Court did not expressly overrule
Sailors, it narrowed the application of legislative/administrative distinctions to that case's particular fact situation by
changing the criterion for "one man, one vote" in the following manner:
[T]he Constitution permits no substantial variation
from equal population in drawing districts for units
of local government having general governmental
powers over the entire geographic area served by the
body.3
Under this test the Court found that, since the powers of the
Midland County Commissioners Court 7 included the authority to make a substantial number of decisions which affected
all citizens, they performed enough general governmental
85. Id. at 480.
36. Id. at 484-85.
37. These powers include levying taxes, equalizing assessments,
maintaining the county jail, adopting the county budget,
housing authority, building and running hospitals, airports,
and determining election districts for county commissioners.
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functions to bring the case within the purview of "one man,
one vote."
The problem that Avery created was the definition of
"general governmental functions" and to what degree this
vague and subjective test would apply in individual units
within local government. Although the first question remains
partially unanswered, the issue of which units come within
the test was involved in the case of Hadley v. Junior College
District of Metropolitan Kansas City, Missouri.8 Here the
Supreme Court, using Avery as primary precedent, extended
"one man, one vote" to the election of junior college school district trustees. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority, rejected the appellee school district's contention that for apportionnent purposes courts should distinguish between elections
for legislative officers and those for administrative officers.
In doing so the Court reaffirmed the "governmental" test
of Avery. The legislative/administrative criterion for distinguishing elections was deemed ineffective. Thus the Court
discarded the old criterion of Sailors by saying:
[T]here is no discernible, valid reason why constitutional distinctions should be drawn on the purpose of
the election. If one person's vote is given less weight
through unequal apportionment, his right to equal
voting participation is impaired just as much when
he votes for a school board member as when he votes
for a state legislator.... [T]he crucial consideration
is the right of each qualified voter to participate on
an equal footing in the election process. It should be
remembered that in cases like this one we are asked
by voters to insure that they are given equal treatment, and from their perspective the harm from unequal treatment is the same in any election, regardless
of the officials selected.39
By dismissing the contention of a legislative/administrative
test, the Court thus indicated that neither the purpose of the
election nor the type of public official to be elected should
have any bearing on the right of a qualified voter to have
equal voting power.4" While there may be differences in the
38. Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, Mo., supra note 8.
39. Id. at 54-55.
40. Id. at 55.
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powers of the various officials, an overlapping of functions
precludes any suitable classification. Moreover, voting debasement arising from unequal apportionment results in impairment just as much when one votes for a school board member
as when one votes for a state legislator. 1 The Court then
stated the following rule:
We therefore hold today that as a general rule, whenever a state or local government decides to select persons by popular election to perform governmental
functions, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter
must be given an equal opportunity to participate in
that election, and when members of an elected body
are chosen from separate districts, each district must
be established on a basis that will insure, as far as is
practicable, that equal numbers of voters can vote for
proportionally equal numbers of officials.2
Henceforth, "one man, one vote" would apply to virtually all
elections, no matter how insignificant. "One man, one vote"
was extended to all elections were governmental powers
existed for two basic reasons. First, there is a difficulty in
attempting to distinguish elections of a legislative or administrative nature where no easily manageable standards exist;
second, the importance of the right to vote equally is always
worthy of protection because an election indicates the importance of the decision to the people. The Court made a significant extension of the doctrine, since it could have relied on
Avery's reasoning exclusively, thereby avoiding the problem
of further extension and qualification. Judge Seiler, in his
dissenting opinion in Hadley at the Missouri Supreme Court
level,4" noted that Avery expressly applied "one man, one
vote" to school boards." The United States Supreme Court
did not mention this specific reference, whether through neglect or intention, thus indicating the Court's refusal to be
strictly bound by the confines of Avery. The ripeness for
extension seemed to be at hand.
41. Id. The Court thus accomplished a smooth transition from state legislative
apportionment in Reynolds to special-purpose units by equating voting
impairment in both situations.
42. Id. at 56.
43. Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, Mo., supra note 4.
44. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968).
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The one remaining qualification of the doctrine lay in the
Avery criterion that there must be general governmental
powers over the area served by the body; it is with this test
that the consolidated school district was brought under "one
man, one vote." The Court reasoned that because the trustees
exercised many powers within the district (though not as great
as those in Avery) 4" those powers were general enough and
had enough impact on the whole district to fall within the
scope of Avery.
Although the Court used Avery as primary precedent for
bringing school boards within the purview of "one man, one
vote," it appeared to modify the general governmental powers
standard in two ways. First, the Court relaxed the standard
by guaranteeing equal voting strength for each voter in all
elections involving governmental powers.4" There is a significant absence of the term "general" as used in Avery, which
indicates that less governmental powers are now required to
apply "one man, one vote." No longer must there be sweeping
powers over the area to be served. It appears, however, that
the Supreme Court, while bringing more elections within the
equal population principle, eliminated the sole qualification
of what constitutes permissible governmental powers. Consequently, it has left the courts and the legislature with an even
less manageable standard than before and has complicated the
evil it sought to remedy. This decision lessens the burden of
showing governmental powers, but in doing so may have
hampered the application of "one man, one vote." Second,
the Court indicated that a somewhat less stringent standard of
exactitude would be required where a special-purpose unit is
involved due to inherent mathematical complications in equally apportioning such a small district.4 7 However, in light of
the court's emphasis on equal voting power regardless of the
election or its purpose, it is difficult to justify a less stringent
45. Powers of the trustees include the power to levy and collect taxes, issue
bonds with certain restrictions, hire and fire teachers, make contracts, pass
on petitions to annex school districts, acquire property by condemnation,
collect fees, supervise and discipline students, and, in general, manage the
operations of the junior college. Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metro.
Kansas City, Mo., supra note 8. Compare with the powers listed in note 37
supra.
46. Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, Mo., supra note 8,
at 56.
47. Id. at 58.
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standard in special-purpose units. Because of the court's determination that equality in elections should extend to all
levels of government, mathematical complications would be
of no consideration. 8
The majority also noted that an exception to the "one
man, one vote" doctrine would arise where
a state elects certain functionaries whose duties are
so far removed from normal governmental activities
and so disproportionately affect different groups
that a popular election in compliance with Reynolds
...might not be required."
However, the Court gave no guidelines for determining what
constitutes duties which are far removed from normal governmental functions and those which disproportionately affect
different groups. By making qualifications for the exception
vague, the court strengthened its primary position that equal
voting power should apply to virtually all elections.
In its desire to avoid a totally pervasive doctrine which
might be viewed as judicial legislation the area of representative government, the majority strove to provide flexibility in
local experimentation and, as a consequence, established three
ways in which legitimate political goals could be attained in
spite of its ruling: (1) governmental units may initiate an
election scheme requiring candidates to be residents of districts which do not contain equal numbers of people, provided
elections are held at large; (2) members of an official body
may be appointed rather than elected because then the official
does not "represent" the people in the traditional voting
sense; and (3) the vote may be limited to a particular class or
group of people."0
Mr. Justice Harlan, with whom Mr. Chief Justice Burger
and Mr. Justice Stewart joined, dissented, warning that application of the "one man, one vote" doctrine to junior college trustees would mean that the principle must be applied to
every elective body, whatever its nature. The dissenters main48. For an excellent analysis of this point see 16 VILL. L. REV. 158, 167-68
(1970).
49. Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, Mo., supra note 8,
at 56.
50. Id. at 58-59.
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tained that such an extension would wrongfully result in the
Court's moving further into the political thicket than it had
already gone in Avery.
Mr. Justice Harlan contended that, in applying" one man,
one vote" to school district trustee elections, the majority
brought the pervasiveness of the federal judiciary into all
phases of the state electoral process, without limitation. However, while it is true that the judicial entry is almost totally
complete, the doctrine of equal population still retains its
qualifications in a limited sense. "One man, one vote" will be
inappropriate where powers exercised by a given elective body
are so far removed from normal government that certain
groups will be affected differently than others. This exception is ambiguous, but it does exist as a limitation on judicial
interference. Of more importance is that voting is a fundamental political right, and if that vote is impaired by an election which results in discrimination toward some portion of
the electorate, it will go unchecked unless the courts take initiative through the Constitution. That each vote is counted
equally must be insured because the voting right is preservative of all rights. To do otherwise would destroy the foundations of representative government in that debasement or
dilution of the weight of one's vote has the same effect as prohibiting that person to freely exercise the right of suffrage.
The dissent also drew a distinction between a local unit
having governmental powers and a special-purpose unit."
The latter would vary in the magnitude of its impact and the
manner in which its benefits and burdens interact in the political and economic picture. Mr. Justice Harlan argued that
imposition of "one man, one vote" would deny local governmental units the flexibility needed to serve specialized functions which varied as local conditions changed 2 His contention that special-purpose units have no substantial identity of
function with state and local general governmental powers
which justify the majority's positions fails to account for the
idea that the powers of a special-purpose unit official, although limited, may be exercised over the area it serves "
51. Id. at 61.
52. Id. at 61-62.
53. Avery v. Midland County, supra note 44, at 485.
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just as completely within its sphere as the governmental
powers on the state and local level. Although the scope is
different, the governmental powers over the area within its
jurisdiction may be essentially the same.
The flexibility of which Mr. Justice Harlan spoke is certainly limited by the majority, but to allow local variations
because of the impact of different benefits and burdens would
only further complicate the problem of distinguishing between
special-unit purposes, desired results, and minute factual differences. Also, the courts would be left without any standard
which legislators could use for determining organizational
districting in compliance with constitutional mandates. Consequently, the danger of abusing equal voting power would increase by legislative groping for permissible limitations. Legislatures should not be prohibited from experimenting so that
more equitable government can be a reality, but such experimentation is more readily workable if conducted within definitely ascertainable boundaries.
The dissent also contended that the organization of the
junior college district represented a "pragmatic choice by all
concerned from a number of possible courses of action," 5 4 and
that such a voluntary arrangement could not be considered an
unconstitutional dilution of votes. This reasoning fails to consider the rights of the injured minority. In all unconstitutional statutes, the arrangement is approved by a majority, i.e.,
voluntary, vote. Mr. Justice Harlan assumed that a majority
vote should be the controlling factor in the Hadley case, and
that an affirmative vote by the electorate indicated approval
of the plan by those voters affected. Voter approval may be a
factor, though not controlling, in the area of voter qualification but only if the approval is based on a compelling state
interest.5 The voter qualification cases can be distinguished
from the Hadley case, however, because they involved total
disenfranchisement of a certain voter sector, whereas Hadley
concerned only partial dilution of voting power. Constitution54. Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, Mo., supra note 8,
at 65.
55. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621
(1969).
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ality cannot be made to turn on voter approval except where
a compelling state interest disfranchises an entire group of
otherwise qualified voters.
Two questions remain unresolved by Hadley. First, the
court gave no definition of "governmental powers." While
keeping in mind that Hadley strove to apply "one man, one
vote" to virtually all elections which involve governmental
powers, the Court still limited itself so as to deny the doctrine's application where the powers involved were far removed from normal governmental functions and the exercise
of the power affected groups differently. In other words, not
only did the Court create the nebulous standard of "governmental powers," it also carved an equally nebulous exception
out of the standard. The definitional problems were not met
by the Court. Because there is no definition available, the
only indication of what constitutes governmental powers must
arise from the factual results in Avery and Hadley. Avery
held "one man, one vote" applicable to the following general
governmental powers: power to tax, issue bonds, adopt a budget, determine election districts, and equalize assessments."
Hadley, using the less stringent test of "governmental powers," applied the doctrine where the following powers existed:
power to levy and collect taxes, issue bonds, make contracts,
acquire property by condemnation, collect fees, and supervise
students.5 These cases possibly indicate that the power to tax
and issue bonds constitutes sufficient governmental powers
to apply "one man, one vote."
Subsequent lower court decisions have shed little light on
the definition. Since Hadley, "one man, one vote" has been
held applicable to the election of political convention delegates on the theory that political parties are, in effect, state
institutions and governmental agencies through which soverign power is exercised by the people." This rationale
stretches the doctrine to its extremes on-the-basis of very indirect "governmental" powers. A case which illustrates well
56. Avery v. Midland County, supra note 44.
57. Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, Mo., supra note 4.
58. Maxey v. Wash. State Democratic Comm., 319 F. Supp. 673, 378 (W.D.
Wash. 1970). For a, contrary view see Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor
,Party of Minn., 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968).
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the situation in which slight governmental powers nevertheless
brought the doctrine into play is Dundee v. Orleans Parish
Board of Supervisors of Elections." In that case, the functions performed by the elected Board of Assessors for the City
of New Orleans were limited to a preliminary assessment of
all taxable property and a computation of the amount of ad
valorum taxes to be charged. Their decisions were subject to
review and change by the Tax Commission. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered this to be sufficient governmental
functions to apply "one man, one vote." The basis for the
holding was not the nature of the duties of the assessors but
rather that the impact created by the Board's decisions so
directly affected the city that equal voting power was necessary. 0 The Dundee case together with the political convention
cases"' illustrate that governmental functions need not be directly exercised over the people; indirect and even contingent
powers seem to be sufficient.
The Supreme Court in Hadley, by attempting to apply the
equal protection requirements to almost all elections while
trying to remain flexible, did exactly what it was trying to
avoid-create unmanageable constitutional standards. By
eliminating the sole qualification set forth in Avery,6 2 it partially destroyed any hope of setting ascertainable standards
for governmental units to follow. By swinging the door open
to strained interpretations, the Court clouded the doctrine.
It may be possible that the Court deliberately made the
constitutional criterion vague so that it could operate on a
case-to-case basis, thus permitting more flexibility for local
experimentation. Nevertheless, the ambiguity leaves the
courts without concrete means to allow exceptions.
The Court did not consider what constitutes a valid apportionment, i.e., whether apportionment must be made on
general population, voter population, or some other basis. In
Hadley apportionment was based on school enumeration-the
number of persons between the ages of six and twenty who
59.
60.
61.
62.

434 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 142.
Maxey v. Wash. State Democratic Comm., supra note 58.
The test of "general governmental powers over the area served by the body"
was changed to "governmental powers."
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resided within the district. The Court questioned whether
school enumeration rather than actual population figures
could be used as a basis of apportionment."3 In Burns v. Richardson," the Supreme Court upheld an apportionment scheme
based on registered voters residing in the area as satisfying
the equal protection clause "only because on [the] record it
was found to have produced a distribution of legislators not
substantially different from that which would have resulted
from the use of a permissible population basis.""5 The Court
stated that total population figures could constitute a distortion of the distribution of the state citizenry but that constititional criteria are met if it appears that "the distribution
of registered voters approximates distribution of state citizens or another permissible population base.""6 Although
Hadley did not determine the constitutionality of the apportionment basis since the whole plan was declared unconstitutional, it indicated that an apportionment base must be equivalent to actual population figures. Beyond that, the question
of what constitutes a valid apportionment basis remains unanswered.
In conclusion, Hadley permitted the entry of the federal
judiciary into the "political thicket." In the nine short years
of its existence the "one man, one vote" doctrine has grown
from the embryonic stage of legislative reapportionment to
local government and finally to special-purpose units within
the local government structure. The United States Supreme
Court has as its goal equality in all elections to insure the
preservation of representative government and the means of
accomplishing this goal lies with individual voting rights.
The doctrine has undergone changes founded on the idealistic
abstraction of representative government and analogies to related areas in arriving at the decision in Hadley, where the
Court guaranteed the individual's right to have his vote count
equally in all elections in which the particular elective body
63. Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, Mo., supra note 8,
at 57.
64. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
65. Id. at 93.
66. Id. at 95. See Ellis v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 352 F.2d 123
(4th Cir. 1965) and Burns v. Gill, 316 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Hawaii 1970)
where the courts considered registered voters apportionment to be more
0rsirable than a total population base.
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maintains governmental powers over the area to be served.
True, the decision presents some definitional problems, but
the logic of the Court was basically sound; since a decision is
considered important enough to warrant an election, the attached significance in itself is sufficient reason to bring the
election within the purview of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
JOHN SUNDAHL
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